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INCENTIVIZING PUBLISHERS TO JOIN A PUBLISHER NETWORK
In a networked environment, such as the Internet or other networks, firstparty content
providers (e.g., publishers) can provide information for public presentation on resources, for
example webpages, documents, applications, and other resources. The firstparty content can
include text, video, and/or audio information provided by the firstparty content providers
via, for example, a resource server for presentation on a client device over the Internet. The
firstparty content may be a webpage requested by the client device, a standalone application
(e.g., a video game, a chat program, etc.) running on the client device, or otherwise.
Additional thirdparty content can also be provided by thirdparty content providers for
presentation on the client device together with the firstparty content. For example, the
thirdparty content may be a public service announcement or advertisement that appears in
conjunction with a requested resource, such as a webpage (e.g., a search result webpage from
a search engine, a webpage that includes an online article, a webpage of a social networking
service, etc.) or with an application (e.g., an advertisement within a game). In some
instances, the thirdparty content may be mobile advertisements (e.g., advertisements for
display on a mobile application of a user device).
A publisher may join an advertising platform. The advertising platform provides
thirdparty content (e.g., advertisements) for display on the resources (e.g., webpages) of the
publisher. One example of an advertising platform is a mobile application advertising
platform configured to provide advertisements for display on a mobile application on a client
device. The publishers are provided revenue as advertisements are provided from the
advertising platform for display on the publisher’s resource.
A publisher may consider several factors when deciding whether to join an
advertising platform. For example, the publishers may take into consideration how much
revenue they will generate per query (e.g., every time a user inputs a query on a client device
and accesses a resource of the publisher). However, the publishers may further consider what
particular features the advertising platform offers. Features may include, for example,
inhouse reservation optimization, user engagement analytics, and crossdevice user
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analytics, among others, all of which can affect the quality of a publisher’s experience with
the advertisement platform.
Publishers may opt not to join a particular advertisement platform if a certain feature
that is important to them is not available. This may make it difficult on the advertisement
platform. On the one hand, publishers may not join an advertisement platform if a certain
feature is not available, but on the other hand, it may be too costineffective to develop a new
feature just to get a few new publishers to join the advertisement platform. However, if the
advertisement platform knew that many publishers would like the feature, then it would be
costeffective to develop the feature. It is difficult to know which features are in high
demand because it is not feasible for sales representatives to talk to more than a very small
fraction of the various publishers that may be interested in the advertisement platform.
This paper discusses an automated system in which publishers would be able to tell
the advertisement platform which features they would value having and how much these
features are worth to them. The advertisement platform can decide which features to develop
as well as which publishers to invite to join the advertisement platform. The advertisement
platform uses the information about how the publishers value certain features to find
publishers who value the same features, before the advertisement platform develops the
features. The advertisement platform may invite the publishers who value the same features
to join the system, and may make temporary payments to the publishers while the features are
developed. This provides an incentive for publishers to reveal their true values for particular
features. This automated system is mutually beneficial to the advertisement platform (to get
more publishers to sign up, and to make an optimal decision about which new features to
develop) and to the publishers (to sign up for a platform with features they desire).
The automated system includes an auction mechanism in which publishers can
express their preferences over how much they value certain features and combinations of
features. Once the automated system has this information, the automated system decides on a
particular set of features to develop and a particular percentage of revenues to offer
publishers to join the advertisement platform while the features are being developed. In some
implementations, only publishers willing to accept less than this percentage will join the
advertisement platform.
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Referring to the Figure, a flow chart of a process for implementing the automated
system is shown. First, publishers are allowed to make bids for features and the
advertisement platform receives the bids. A bid for a particular feature or combination of
features may indicate a minimum percentage of additional revenue the publisher is willing to
accept as payment in order to join the advertising platform if the feature or features are
developed. Publishers may make bids for as many different features or combinations of
features as they would like. In doing this, publishers can make a bid that gives the percentage
of revenues they are willing to accept for some minimum feature set that the publisher is
willing to accept. In some implementations, publishers can also make bids expressing
preferences over other combinations of features. For instance, a publisher might enter a bid
that indicates it would need to obtain a relatively large payment from the advertisement
platform in order to join the platform if the platform only develops particular features that the
publisher views as absolutely essential. However, the same publisher may also say it is
willing to accept a smaller payment from the advertisement platform if the platform also
develops other features that are less essential but preferred by the publisher. In other words,
the publishers indicate how much revenue they are willing to accept from the platform in
exchange for particular features (i.e., accepting less revenue if additional features are
provided to them).
Once the advertisement platform receives bids from many publishers, it decides on a
particular combination of features to develop, as well as a percentage of revenues to offer
publishers to join the platform while they are in the process of developing the features. The
features are chosen in order to maximize the welfare of the advertisement platform.
The calculation to determine which features to develop and what percentage of
revenue to offer the publishers is now described. For any fixed combination of features, the
advertisement platform calculates the percentage that would maximize the economic welfare
of the platform. This may take into account the value of bringing on publishers who are
willing to accept less than this percentage to join the platform as the features are developed as
well as the cost of paying this percentage to each publisher. In general, setting a higher
percentage will have the benefit of attracting a larger number of publishers to join the
advertisement platform, but has the cost of having to pay a larger amount to the publishers
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who end up joining the advertisement platform. The percentage can be set in such a way that
the marginal economic benefits of attracting a larger number of publishers through a slightly
larger percentage roughly balances with the marginal economic cost of having to pay the
larger amount to publishers who do join the system.
Once a percentage of revenues is determined for each combination of features, the
advertisement platform determines which combination of features should be chosen to result
in the largest economic benefit of the platform. This takes into account the cost of
developing the features, the percentage of revenues that will be paid back to the publishers,
and the particular publishers that will be brought into the platform if the features are
developed.
A particular combination of features and percentage of revenues are chosen. If a
publisher makes a bid for some subset of the chosen features that the platform decided to
develop, and the bid is for a lower percentage of revenues than the chosen percentage of
revenues, then that publisher is invited to join the advertisement platform. Otherwise, the
publisher is not invited to join the advertisement platform.
The automated system allows for an auction mechanism that enables bidders (e.g.,
publishers) to express how much they value any particular combination of goods (i.e.,
combination of features). In some implementations, this information is aggregated by
deciding on a single combination of goods (i.e., a single set of features) that will be
developed and a single price (i.e., a single percentage of seller revenues) at which the features
will be sold. Only bidders willing to accept a subset of the developed features at less than the
single price being offered are invited to join the system.
The following is an example implementation of the automated system and process
above. A publisher makes two bids indicating they will join the advertisement platform if:
(1) the platform develops inhouse reservation optimizations, and agrees to pay the publisher
an additional 15% while the feature is developed, or (2) the platform develops both inhouse
reservation optimizations and user engagement analytics, and agrees to pay the publisher an
additional 12% while the features are developed. Whether the publisher is invited will then
depend on which features the platform decides to develop and the percentage of publisher
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revenues that the platform decides to offer publishes while the features are being developed.
This is largely based on bids made by other publishers.
If the advertisement platform decides to develop inhouse reservation optimizations,
and offers 20% of publisher revenues while the feature is developed, then the publisher is
invited to join the advertisement platform and is paid an additional 20% of its revenues while
the feature is developed. If the advertisement platform decides to develop inhouse
reservation optimizations, and offers 13% of publisher revenues while the feature is
developed, then the publisher is not invited to join the advertisement platform. If the
advertisement platform decides to develop inhouse reservation optimizations and user
engagement analytics, and offers 13% of publisher revenues while the features are developed,
then the publisher is invited to join the advertisement platform and is paid an additional 13%
of its revenues while the features are developed. If the advertisement platform decides to
develop an IAP optimization engine (e.g., a feature not specified by the publisher), then the
publisher is not invited to join the advertisement platform since the publisher indicated they
were only willing to join if other features (i.e., inhouse reservation optimizations) are
implemented.
One advantage of the automated system and process described above is that the best
strategy for the publisher is to truthfully tell the advertisement platform what percentage of
the revenues they would need to receive in order for the publisher to join if a certain
combination of features is developed. If a large number of publishers participate in the
process, then any one publisher’s bid will have a small or negligible effect on the final
percentages offered by the advertisement platform. Since the percentage is roughly fixed, a
publisher wants to ensure that it is able to join the advertisement platform if and only if the
publisher is willing to accept less than the percentage of revenues offered. The publishers
can ensure this by truthfully revealing what percentage of revenues they need, so truthful
revelation is the best strategy for the publisher to follow.
For the advertisement platform, since the platform is choosing which features to
develop and the percentage of revenues to offer publishers in such a way to maximize its
economic welfare, the best possible economic outcome for the advertisement platform is
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ensured. The advertisement platform would be able to express the final outcome of the
auction (i.e., the chosen features and percentage of revenues) in a transparent and simple way.
The strategies for publishers in the auction mechanism are fairly simple. The
publisher only needs to specify which particular features the advertisement platform needs to
develop, as well as the percentage of revenues they would need to be offered in the meantime
for them to join the advertisement platform while the features are developed. The publishers
would not have to do any significant strategic planning beyond figuring out which features
they want. The publishers would have the flexibility to reveal their values for a wide range of
possible combination of features. In particular, this would allow publishers to effectively
label some features as required if they are to join the platform, and other features as nice to
have but less essential.
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Figure 1. A flow chart of a process for selecting a combination of features to develop
for an advertisement platform, and a percentage of revenues to offer publishers for
developing the features, and for inviting publishers to join the advertisement platform.
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